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I.  INTRODUCTION: LAW AND RELIGION 
Legal speech and religious speech inevitably do some of the same work.  
Both are vehicles through which we both talk about and become the kind of 
people we are.  Granted, those of us who teach and argue about the law do 
not often conceive of our work in this way.  That is part of what I hope to 
begin to remedy in this essay.  While the construction of character is a more 
obvious aspect of religious than legal thought, law, including legal 
argument, can be constitutive in similar ways.  If so—if our ways of talking 
about the law serve some of the same ends as do our ways of talking about 
religion—then we may be able to learn how better to talk about the law by 
thinking about how we talk about religion.  I do not mean things like 
paragraph structure or argument organization or the proper use of headings, 
but rather something more subtle and more fundamental.  One way to put it 
is this: legal speech can learn from religious speech how to be less small, 
and perhaps more ennobling. 
More specifically, those of us who speak and teach about the law may 
be able to learn from religious ways of speaking and preaching how better to 
 *  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  This Article is 
a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing 
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
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think about and take responsibility for the potential impact of what we say 
on those to whom we speak.  And by impact, here I mean not merely our 
influence over what people do.  We should, of course, be thoughtful about 
and take responsibility for what we persuade people to do.  But I mean 
something more.  We should also pay attention to the effects we may have 
on who people become, and, ultimately, whether they thrive.  While lawyers 
rarely, if ever, confront such matters, preachers do.  They have no choice.  
Those who talk about religion are forced by their subject matter to address 
questions of character and thriving—to think and speak about the ways in 
which who we are impacts how well and fully we live.  This is never easy, 
nor should it be, but preachers cannot be afraid to talk about what matters, 
even when the things that matter prove difficult to define or impossible to 
measure.  Lawyers should aspire to the same courage, and may be able to 
learn from the ways in which preachers speak in the face of this challenge. 
II.  CHARACTER AND THRIVING 
Because legal work does not often force us to wrestle with difficult 
questions of character and thriving, we can and do often ignore such matters.  
But ignoring difficult questions does not make them go away; and ignoring 
these sorts of difficult questions does not mean that lawyers have no impact 
on the character or thriving of those to whom we speak.  It simply means 
that we are not aware of or thoughtful about the impact we may have.  We 
should be. 
The title of this essay is taken from a speech which is in some sense 
both legal and religious.  The speech is that of Socrates to the Athenian 
jurors, as reported or re-created by Plato in the Apology.1  This is a legal 
speech in that Socrates is responding to legal charges.2  It is also a religious 
speech, however—both in that the charges to which he responds are 
religious in nature and, more fundamentally, in that he broadens and 
enlarges the conversation to encompass matters which may seem to us more 
appropriate to religious than legal speech, but which are, in fact, at the heart 
of both.3  In the process, Socrates explains why he has refused to engage in 
the usual and expected practice of pleading for sympathy.4  He first says that 
to do so would be improper, for particular reasons to which we will return.5  
More generally, Socrates argues and illustrates that his responsibility is not 
merely or even primarily to secure an acquittal—an end we can take as 
 1.  PLATO, APOLOGY OF SOCRATES (translation by author). 
 2.  Id. at 18a–b. 
 3.  Id. at 19b–c, 24b–c. 
 4.  Id. at 34b–c. 
 5.  Id. at 34d–35b. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:28 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1371, 2013] To Teach and Persuade 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1373 
standing for any of the things for which and about which we argue in the 
law—but rather to teach and persuade.6  These, he explains and illustrates, 
are always the dual motives of thoughtful responsible speech; they have 
guided the conduct of his life and they will motivate and guide his speech 
and conduct in the face of death.7 
What then does it mean to take responsibility for our speech as not 
merely a vehicle through which we persuade others and seek various ends—
as crucial, as much a matter of life and death, as those ends may be—but 
also as a way in which we, inevitably if often indirectly, teach?  And in what 
way can those who teach and persuade about law and those who teach and 
persuade about religion learn from each other how better to confront and live 
up to this responsibility? 
The first and most basic lesson law can take from religion, and from 
Socrates, is that what matters is not just what we can get or do, but also who 
we are.  To my knowledge, no religious tradition teaches that the most 
important things in life are how rich we are, how safe we are, how long we 
live, or any such measure of objective well-being.  Let alone does any 
worthwhile tradition hold that our lives should be measured by how many of 
our various preferences we are able to satisfy.  Instead, religious thought 
recognizes that what matters more is what kind of people we are able to 
become.  And on this point, religious thought is simply right.  Character 
matters.  I do not mean to be glib, but in fact I do not think many would 
express good faith disagreement with this point—at least stated at this level 
of generality.  Now, I do not mean that character matters in the abstract 
sense that it is ontologically more important than material well-being or 
preference satisfaction.  That may be true, but that is not my claim here.  Nor 
do I mean that character matters in the strictly religious sense that certain 
ways of being will better please God or will earn one the reward of an 
afterlife.  That may be true as well, but I claim no such insight.  Instead, 
what I mean is that whether we live full and happy lives—whether we thrive 
here in this life—depends as much on what kind of people we are able to 
become as it does on any measurable aspect of material well-being or any 
degree of preference satisfaction. 
Now, some will object that even if character is central to thriving, law 
and legal speech should have nothing to do with either—that it would be 
somehow inappropriate for lawmakers or legal scholars or law teachers to 
think about the effects of what we do and say on those with whom we act 
 6.  Id. at 35b–c. 
 7.  Id. at 29c–d. 
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and speak.  For example, one form of this objection would point out that we 
can never expect a clear or objective definition of what it means to thrive, let 
alone can we hope for general agreement on the matter.  Perhaps the reason 
to focus on small things, like health and wealth and safety, is that at least 
those things can be defined and measured with some precision, and we can 
presumably all agree that they are, for whatever little good they do, good 
things.  If so, the objection goes, law and politics should focus on providing 
these sorts of basic prerequisites, and leave deeper questions to private life—
to religion, perhaps.  Alternatively, and closely related, perhaps it would 
represent an illegitimate intrusion on autonomy for public institutions, such 
as law, even to consider such matters.  Or perhaps we might simply doubt 
the capacity of lawyers and lawmakers to think about these things well, and 
thus, prefer they leave the matter alone entirely. 
These are real and serious objections, which can take many forms.  
Ideally, I would do what persuasive lawyers and thoughtful scholars do.  I 
would respond to these objections fully before moving on to whatever 
particular issues I hope to examine. 
I am, however, faced with two related difficulties.  First, I cannot re-
justify my entire project each time I talk about it.  I recall one workshop in 
which I never got to the matter I hoped to address because the entire hour 
was spent justifying the legitimacy of my inquiry to a handful of very smart 
and thoughtful, but skeptical, colleagues.  More to the point, these seemingly 
threshold objections actually go to the heart of the matter.  For example, my 
focus on rhetoric rather than regulation is intended in part to respond to 
autonomy concerns.  In addition, the willingness and capacity to talk about 
and aspire to things we cannot define with precision is itself one of the traits 
I will suggest we should most strive to develop and engender.  More 
generally, these questions—questions of why and how we might 
thoughtfully take into account and take responsibility for the effects of our 
work in the law on character and thriving, without, for example, impinging 
illegitimately on the autonomy of others or intruding inappropriately on 
matters better left to private institutions—are the very things I hope to 
examine.  So, these seemingly threshold objections must be met through, 
rather than as a prelude to, the sort of conversation I hope to engender. 
So, for now, let this much suffice.  Unless we can assume that law and 
the ways we talk about law have no impact on our character and thriving, it 
is simply irresponsible to disregard that impact.  And it is not safe to assume 
that the ways we talk about the law have no impact on who we are.  We 
become who we are in part through the communities in which we live and 
grow, and law—including, crucially, how we talk about law—helps 
construct those communities.  More than that, we become who we are, as 
individuals and communities, in large part through how we act and how we 
speak, and law is a vehicle through which we act and speak as a community.  
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Legal speech, like religious speech, may therefore construct character, which 
in turn may impact our capacity to live well and fully, whether we like it or 
not.  We cannot simply wish away the effects of what we do and say.  We 
may think that oil companies should have nothing to do with the 
environment, or that international trade should have nothing to do with 
human rights, but they do.  We can ignore the indirect consequences of what 
we do and say in the law.  We can fail to take responsibility for those 
consequences or declare them to be out of our jurisdiction, but we cannot 
thereby make them go away. 
I cannot demonstrate empirically that persuasion impacts character, in 
large part because character is not something that can be measured.  It might 
be possible for social scientists to test the matter, but it would be difficult.  
The changes about which I suggest we should be concerned are almost 
certain to be incremental and cumulative.  Although I use specific examples 
to illustrate the ways in which speech may construct character, what we need 
to think about are the potential effects of our persistent habits of speech over 
time.  Imagine trying to determine whether smoking causes cancer by 
conducting experiments in which subjects are asked to smoke a few 
cigarettes and then are tested for cancer.  We might well conclude that 
smoking has no effect.  Moreover, we are trying to be thoughtful about not 
only potential changes in people’s attitudes about the things about which we 
persuade them, but rather subtle changes in their thinking more generally—
not just their opinions, but their character.  We could improve our imagined 
smoking research by extending the experiment over time or by using 
epidemiological rather than experimental data.  That is possible because 
smoking and cancer are things we can define clearly and measure.  
Persuasion and character are neither.  But that does not mean we can safely 
or in good conscience ignore the link between the two.  Indeed, as I suggest 
below, the willingness and ability to confront things we cannot define or 
measure is itself a trait we should try to engender. 
In the meantime, if we have good reason to be concerned, based on what 
we do know about persuasion, that when we convince we may also 
construct, we have equally good reason to consider and be thoughtful about 
that possibility.  And we do have good reason to be concerned. 
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III.  PERSUASION AND CHARACTER 
Having made the point at some length in a recent essay,8 and hoping to 
explore rather than simply repeat it here, I will not rehearse systematically 
the entire general argument for believing that persuasion may be constitutive 
of character.  The basic claim, however, is this: persuasion succeeds, if it 
succeeds, not by force of abstract logic, but by finding or making space in 
the constitutive world views—the beliefs, understanding, and priorities—of 
those we persuade.  Unless we believe that the beliefs and understandings 
and priorities of those we persuade are always fully developed and 
permanently fixed, we should recognize that when we persuade we do not 
simply find, but, crucially, sometimes also may make space in their world 
views.  When we persuade, we also teach; when we teach, we may construct.  
If so, we should think about what we may be doing to people when we 
persuade them.  For example, one might hesitate to use an appeal to racism 
as a persuasive device, even in an effort to persuade people to do something 
one considers good and valuable.  Why?  In part because one might 
recognize that to appeal to racism risks constructing or entrenching it.  We 
should take responsibility for not just what we persuade people to do, but 
also for who we help them become in the process. 
As noted, in the Apology, Socrates does not plead for his life or for 
sympathy in the way that that the jurors would have expected.  In explaining 
why, he makes explicit what is implicit throughout his speech—his 
awareness of and concern for the indirect constitutive impact of his speech.  
After noting that it would cast the city in a bad light if those thought best 
among them were seen to behave so shamefully, he gets to the heart of the 
matter: 
Apart from reputation, Gentlemen, it does not seem to me right to 
plead with the jury or to try to get off the hook by begging, rather 
than to teach and persuade.  Not for this is a juror empanelled—to 
hand out justice as a favor; but rather to judge according to it.  And 
he has sworn not to favor whoever he should prefer, but to judge 
according to the law.  And we should not accustom you to disregard 
your oath; nor should you become accustomed to doing so.  For 
then neither of us would be displaying piety.9 
The Greek here translated as “accustom” and “accustomed” are forms of 
the verb  (ethidzo), which means something deeper than the 
translation might suggest.  It is the source of our words “ethic” and “ethical,” 
 8.  See Sherman J. Clark, What We Make Matter, 109 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2011). 
 9.  PLATO, supra note 1, at 35b–c. 
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and connotes not merely habits of action, but also habits of mind, ways of 
thinking and being—character as well as conduct.  Socrates is not merely 
saying that breaking an oath is a harmful or wrong thing to do.  He is also 
saying that being an oath-breaker is a bad way to be.  He is explicitly 
concerned not only with what he might persuade them to do, but with who 
he might help them become in the process. 
In thinking about how we might emulate Socrates and take 
responsibility for the ethical consequences of our efforts at persuasion, it 
may be helpful to identify four overlapping ways in which speech may 
construct character: direct exhortation, direct attribution, modeling of traits, 
and, most subtle but also perhaps most crucial, various modes of indirect 
attribution and development.  My particular emphasis here is on the last of 
these possibilities—on the indirect ways in which our speech may help 
constitute traits, priorities, or capacities in those to whom we speak.  
Nothing hinges on these particular labels, and my aim here is exploration 
rather than typology.  My goal is not to construct a theory of constitutive 
rhetoric, but rather to think more fully about the ways in which we—often 
indirectly and inadvertently—may construct or influence the character, and 
thus the capacity to thrive, of those we teach and persuade. 
A.  Direct Exhortation 
First, and perhaps most obviously, there is direct exhortation.  Religious 
speech often exhorts listeners to specific traits, directly connecting certain 
ways of being to benefits and rewards here on earth or in the hereafter.  The 
Sermon on the Mount is perhaps the most powerful example,10 but we could 
list virtually unlimited examples. 
Legal or political speech can, under certain circumstances, try to do this 
sort of thing as well.  Think of FDR or Churchill exhorting citizens to 
courage in the face of need or strife, or Presidents Kennedy or Bush or 
Obama encouraging public spirit and selflessness.  But this most obvious 
method of building character through speech may, in the legal and political 
context, in fact, be the least interesting, and the least problematic.  First of 
all, it is not clear how often in day-to-day legal or political life we will find it 
 10.  Matthew 5:1–10 (New King James Version) (“Blessed are the poor in spirit, For theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven.  Blessed are those who mourn, For they shall be comforted.  Blessed are the 
meek, For they shall inherit the earth.  Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, 
For they shall be filled.  Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy.  Blessed are the pure 
in heart, For they shall see God.  Blessed are the peacemakers, For they shall be called sons of God.  
Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, For theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”). 
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appropriate or effective to speak in such direct ways about character and 
thriving.  Most contexts for legal or political speech are ones in which we 
are unlikely to make, and our listeners unlikely to be receptive to, direct 
sermons on how to live. 
In fact, direct exhortation in legal and political speech is perhaps more 
likely to set up obstacles than to enhance either persuasion or teaching.  To 
describe a legal argument or political speech as a sermon or as preaching can 
carry connotations of self-righteousness and closed-mindedness—neither of 
which perceptions are conducive to persuasion.  To the contrary, successful 
persuasion is marked above all by the ability to communicate to one’s 
listener that one has heard and understood the listener’s point of view.  
Moreover, when character traits are extolled directly, there is less question 
of failing to take responsibility for the traits we may construct on those we 
persuade, and less risk that there will be unintended negative consequences.  
Listeners can agree or disagree, accept or reject explicit arguments about 
how to live, and to that extent, explicit exhortation is not problematic in the 
same ways that the indirect influence of our arguments might be. 
B.  Direct Attribution 
A less obvious, but still explicit, way argument can build virtue is by 
what might be called direct attribution.  Sometimes we can nurture traits not 
by preaching them, but rather by attributing those traits to those with whom 
we speak.  If this is done thoughtfully—and, crucially, if the seed is there to 
be nurtured—we can build virtues by helping people see themselves as 
having that virtue. 
Socrates does this, early in the Apology, when he attributes the virtue of 
fair-mindedness to the jurors to whom he is speaking.  Having described the 
charges leveled against him on the present occasion and throughout his life, 
and claimed that those charges were false, Socrates continues: 
Now perhaps someone among you might respond: “But, Socrates, 
what is the trouble about you?  Where have these accusations 
against you come from?  For certainly all this talk and dispute about 
you has not arisen with you doing nothing different than others, 
unless you were doing something other than most men; so tell us 
what it is, so that we may not act rashly in your case.”11 
Socrates attributes to the jurors, by literally putting words into their mouths, 
a desire not to act rashly.  He does not, in this passage, exhort them to the 
trait of fair-mindedness, but rather credits them with it.  What he is doing is 
 11.  PLATO, supra note 1, at 20c–d. 
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giving them a way of seeing themselves—helping them see what they look 
like in that light.  Like a tailor encourages a man try on a suit: If he 
recognizes how good he looks and feels in it, he is more likely to wear it. 
Socrates attributed to his hearers a question, and thus a set of concerns 
and motives.  Similarly, contrast the questions that John F. Kennedy and 
Ronald Reagan each suggested Americans ask themselves.  In 1961, 
Kennedy famously attributed to his hearers an unselfish willingness to be of 
service: “Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do 
for your country.”12  Two decades later, Ronald Reagan attributed to us a 
very different motive: “[I]t might be well if you would ask yourself, are you 
better off than you were four years ago?”13 
And back to Socrates: When he makes the bold claim that his 
troublesome questioning has actually been a great service to his city, he 
likens Athens, and by implication the jurors to whom he is speaking, to a 
thoroughbred horse, noble and well-bred, but grown sluggish and thus in 
need of a gadfly.  Again, he is directly, although not heavy-handedly, 
attributing to his listeners a set of traits—good breeding, nobility, and 
strength—so that they can learn to see themselves in those ways. 
Now, if these traits were not to some extent present, this would be to no 
effect.  It would be neither persuasive nor constitutive.  Moreover, it is 
neither our nor Socrates’ aim to abet hypocrisy and self-delusion.  But our 
legal and academic culture seems to be sufficiently adept at puncturing 
those, and unfulfilled aspiration is not hypocrisy.  We are very good at 
taking a man down a peg when we feel he deserves it.  We should learn also 
how to lift him up. 
Allow me to offer an example neither legal nor religious, but rather 
personal.  In the late 1960s, my mixed-race family moved into a working-
class white neighborhood just outside of Baltimore.  To say that there was 
panic among the neighbors might be slightly too strong, but only slightly.  
Many feared that what had happened in other nearby communities would 
happen there—rapid racial change, lower housing values, perceived 
deterioration.  White flight.  My father, who was black, talked with the men 
as he would see them outside, washing their cars, trimming their neat 
hedges, sitting on their porches.  Sometimes, not having been invited in, he 
would stand on a driveway or a front stoop with an uncertain and potentially 
 12.  President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in ROBERT DALLEK & 
TERRY GOLWAY, LET EVERY NATION KNOW: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN HIS OWN WORDS 82 (2006). 
 13.  Governor Ronald Reagan, Presidential Debate (Oct. 28, 1980), in KIRON K. SKINNER ET AL., 
THE STRATEGY OF CAMPAIGNING: LESSONS FROM RONALD REAGAN & BORIS YELTSIN 196 (2007). 
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unfriendly neighbor, make some small talk about the weather, cut the tension 
by offering and sharing a smoke.  He would pause, look up and down the 
street of neat brick homes as if appreciating it for the first time, and say 
something like this: 
Believe it or not, I get what you’re looking at.  I do.  You’re looking 
out for your family.  You’re thinking you can’t afford to sit and wait 
until it’s too late.  Then you’re stuck in a bad neighborhood with a 
house you can’t sell.  I hear you.  And I don’t mean to get into your 
business, but for a lot of people what they’ve got invested in their 
house is a big part of what they’ve got.  They can’t afford to risk 
that.  I get that too.  So, you’re thinking maybe you should sell 
quick if you can—get out while you can.  Listen, I haven’t gotten a 
chance to get to know you real well yet, but I can already tell one 
thing about you.  You don’t want to leave your home where you’ve 
made a life, where your kids are happy, just because some black 
folks moved in down the street.  You don’t judge a man by color.  I 
can see that.  That’s why I knew I could talk to you.  You judge a 
man by how he works—how he takes care of his family.  And 
you’re just trying to take care of yours.  I can relate.  That’s all I’m 
doing here—trying to take care of mine.  So the way I see it, what 
we have to do is find how to talk to the neighbors—let you all let 
each other know that if you don’t sell your house no one can buy 
it—let each other know not to let some slick real estate agents bust 
up your neighborhood and run you out of your homes. 
Now, it would be nice if I could report that conversations like this 
always had the desired effect.  But some neighbors, as my father knew, 
really were so poisoned by racism and fear that they would rather uproot 
their families than live by black folks.  And so some did.  But many were 
not, and did not.  The neighborhood changed, but slowly, and remained for 
many decades that all too rare American phenomenon—the truly integrated 
community.  And, more to the present point, some of those conversations 
may have had another, indirect effect.  Just as the fear-mongering of real 
estate churners bred racism and xenophobia, I like to think that my father’s 
attribution of better motives may have helped construct and reinforce those 
better motives. 
It may seem as though this example of potentially constitutive personal 
conversation may not tell us much about whether speech in other contexts 
may have similar effects.  First, even assuming that my father’s character-
building impact has not been rather magnified by the lenses of time and filial 
pride, how many people will find themselves with the opportunity and 
capacity to be similarly influential?  Second, can this sort of thing really 
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happen when we talk to groups and in public, as opposed to one-on-one on 
Baltimore Stoa? 
Good questions, and ones which to some extent answer each other.  
Granted, few, if any, talks will be as salient as I like to think my father’s 
may have been; even as to him, I hesitate to over-claim.  The fact is that few 
particular conversations will make a substantial impact on anyone’s 
character.  Nor did any particular cigarette ever give anyone cancer.  Again, 
the effect is marginal and cumulative—like the effect of particular legal 
rules on the economy, or the effect of lawnmower engines on global 
warming.  That, however, is exactly why turning from private to public 
discourse may give us more, rather than less, reason to think about the 
potentially constitutive effects of the way we speak.  In thinking about the 
effect of any particular example of speech, therefore, the direction of the 
vector may matter more than its magnitude.  Although particular examples 
are the best, if not the only, way to get at the problem, we really need to 
think about the cumulative effect of the ways we choose to teach and 
persuade, and the more subtle and indirect ways in which we may have those 
effects. 
C.  What Traits? 
To think well or usefully about the more subtle and indirect ways in 
which our speech may influence the character and thriving of those with 
whom we speak, we need to think a bit more concretely about character and 
thriving.  What do we mean by character?  We are not referring to a binary 
trait, such that a person could be said simply to have character or not, or 
even to a one-dimensional quality, such that one person might simply have 
more character than another.  I understand, of course, what we mean when 
we speak in those ways, as we often do.  We are presumably using the term 
“character” as shorthand for a set of more specific traits and priorities and 
capacities—perhaps integrity, honesty, and the like.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with using the term in that way—to allude to and draw on 
an implicit, if vague, cultural agreement about a set of useful or desirable 
qualities—but here we need to be more specific.  What traits, priorities, and 
capacities should we be willing indirectly to help constitute in those we 
persuade?  More to the point, how are those aspects of character connected 
to thriving? 
I recognize that to offer even a partial and tentative substantive account 
of character and human thriving in the context of making a point about legal 
and religious rhetoric may seem like unnecessary hubris.  It is not.  It is not 
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unnecessary because trying to think about the effect of speech on character 
without considering what traits we hope or are willing to construct would be 
like talking about medicine without some sense of what we mean by health.  
We could do it, but not well.  In particular, as we turn to the more indirect, 
even inadvertent, ways in which speech may construct traits, it is even more 
critical to ground the conversation in at least some sense of what those traits 
might be.  Nor is there any greater degree of hubris revealed by this effort 
than that which is on display in the hundreds or thousands of pieces of legal 
scholarship which, although not addressing such matters explicitly, blithely 
rely on implicit, but unexamined, assumptions about these critical 
underlying questions. 
For example, those who ground their utilitarian thinking in objective 
well-being or preference satisfaction may purport not to be making claims 
about human thriving, but they are.  All such accounts assume that whatever 
it is they are trying to maximize will conduce to human thriving.  Either that 
or, not to put too fine a point on it, they are pointless.  Imagine a line of legal 
scholarship devoted to figuring out how the law can make people’s hair 
blonder.  That would be silly.  But why?  Because we have no reason to 
believe that making people’s hair blonder is a worthwhile way to spend our 
time and resources.  But why?  Because we have no reason to believe that 
making people’s hair blonder is an important component of or vehicle for 
human thriving.  And that is always, at bottom, our goal—to thrive. 
Utilitarian thinking is worthwhile to the extent that we assume that 
whatever we are trying to maximize—whether objective goods such as 
health, wealth, safety, and the like, or preference satisfaction of some sort— 
are components of or will conduce to better lives.  These assumptions may 
be sensible in some cases, but are not entitled to the hegemony they enjoy.  
In fact, it is not at all clear that these are the primary components of human 
thriving.  Utilitarians have a theory of thriving—that it consists in or is 
facilitated by some form of objective well-being or preference satisfaction.  
Otherwise, why care about those things?  Presumably, they do not believe 
they are just trying to dye our hair.  And we too have a theory of thriving—
that it depends at least in part on character, on what sort of people we are 
able to become.  We are simply more willing to explore ours. 
To this end, then, let me offer a set of traits which we might hope to 
construct, or at least not undercut, through our speech.  I have started to 
develop this account more fully in earlier work, but here a partial sketch of a 
subset of that account will suffice.  The traits I suggest we aspire to engender 
are what might be described as the inward aspects of what are traditionally 
described and thought about as external virtues.  They are habits of mind 
which manifest themselves in the habits of action described by the classical 
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virtues of courage, temperance, piety, wisdom, justice, and prudence.14  In 
particular, allow me to focus here on two of these re-imagined classical 
virtues—the two that will perhaps, at first glance, seem both the least well-
suited to modern life and the least appropriate subjects of public concern: 
temperance and piety.  These are traits that augment, rather than limit, the 
autonomy of those who develop them, and which can be encouraged in ways 
that fully respect that same autonomy.  More to the point, these are virtues 
which seem at least as likely as health or wealth or preference satisfaction to 
conduce to a rich and full life in those who develop them. 
Now, I do hope this limited and tentative account of just two of many 
potentially valuable habits of mind will be found appealing and plausible, so 
far as it goes—especially given the level of generality at which I frame the 
traits and the fact that they are essentially re-descriptions of traditional 
virtues long recognized as central by overlapping philosophical and religious 
traditions.  But I do not need agreement on the merits of my particular list of 
virtues to make my point here.  In fact, I welcome disagreement.  I hope to 
encourage conversation about what sorts of traits may conduce to thriving, 
not end it.  But this will give us enough to work with—a tentative set of at 
least provisionally desirable traits to keep in mind as we think about the 
indirect ways in which speech may construct character and thus impact the 
capacity to thrive of those to whom we speak. 
Temperance is traditionally understood as restraint in the pursuit of 
pleasure—self-control, moderation, or abstinence—particularly with regard 
to physical pleasures such as sex or food and drink.  One way to imagine this 
trait is as a matter of willpower—as simply forcing oneself to forgo or limit 
pleasures.  The restraint or moderation known as temperance, however, can 
also be understood as an external manifestation of a certain internal trait or 
habit of mind—a lack of excessive desire or concern about pleasure.  A 
person who does not care much for pleasure is more likely to be moderate in 
its pursuit.  The ways of acting traditionally described as temperance reveal, 
and potentially construct, a way of thinking.  That is what I mean by 
temperance here—the habit of mind of not caring much about physical 
pleasure. 
 14.  See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, Neoclassical Public Virtues: Towards an Aretaic Theory of 
Law-Making (and Law Teaching), in LAW, VIRTUE AND JUSTICE (Amalia Amaya & Hock Lai Ho 
eds., forthcoming Oct. 2012) [hereinafter Clark, Neoclassical Public Virtues]; Sherman J. Clark, 
Ennobling Direct Democracy, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1341, 1347 n.7 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, 
Ennobling Direct Democracy]. 
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Now, one way to conceive of this internalized version of temperance is 
that it must involve inuring oneself—deadening oneself to pleasure.  That is 
how stoicism is often misunderstood—as the capacity to deaden oneself to 
pleasure, or to pain.  But there is a better way to understand stoic thinking, 
and thus temperance.  It is having something better on one’s mind, such that 
physical pleasures do not loom large.  Imagine that you have the chance to 
attend a great event—fifty-yard-line Superbowl tickets, an audience with the 
Pope, Yo-Yo Ma performing Bach in an intimate performance for you and a 
few friends, dinner with Nelson Mandela and Bono—whatever you would 
consider the most remarkable opportunity.  Now, imagine that your chair is 
not quite as comfortably padded as you might prefer.  It is a perfectly good 
chair, just not so soft as you might ideally desire.  You could sit in a softer 
chair, but that would require you to move to a seat in another room, where 
you would be limited in your ability to see or hear or participate in the event.  
I suppose you would not move.  Nor, as you listened or watched or 
participated, would you spend much time thinking about your chair.  If 
someone were to compliment you on your “stoicism” or your “temperance,” 
you would find the compliment strange and unwarranted.  Of course, you 
would not compromise that wonderful opportunity for the dubious pleasure 
of a better seat cushion. 
That is what I mean by temperance—moderation in pursuit of pleasure 
because you have something better on your mind.  This is, I suggest, a habit 
of mind worth developing, and one worth helping others develop.  It remains 
to be seen whether or how we can help others develop this trait in ways 
which do not violate their autonomy or pose the risks which make us fearful 
of thinking about character, and in particular, how our ways of speaking and 
arguing might accomplish this end. 
But first, let us get one more potentially desirable trait on the table.  If 
we want people to have better things on their mind, we can perhaps help 
them do just that.  The difficulty is that we do not yet know, and certainly 
cannot yet agree on, what those better things are or should be.  Thus we 
need, or might benefit greatly from, a trait or habit of mind which can help 
us deal with that difficulty.  The traditional virtue of piety—rethought in a 
way analogous to the way in which we have rethought temperance—may be 
able to do just that. 
Piety is the virtue which perhaps requires the most redescription if it is 
to be seen as applicable to secular matters, let alone as an appropriate subject 
of public concern, but it is also the trait which is most central to my account 
and to my aim in this essay.  Traditionally, piety has been understood as the 
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proper fulfillment of duties to God or the gods.15  We can, however, 
redescribe this trait as the habit of mind or capacity engendered by and 
manifested through outward actions of piety or holiness.  And what is that 
habit of mind?  It is the capacity to care about, respect, and pursue things 
beyond our ken.  It is not only this, but it is at least this much.  And this 
much will do.  Acts of piety—keeping Kosher, going to Mass, performing 
the Salah—serve many functions in the lives of those who perform them, but 
they all do at least this.  They reveal a belief and serve as a reminder that 
much of what matters is beyond our grasp.  And this—this capacity to aspire 
to what we cannot yet measure or define—is the virtue I suggest we should 
strive to engender. 
Why so?  Why seek to develop this capacity?  Three reasons, at least.  
First, because the things we can describe precisely and measure are not 
enough.  We know that much.  Thriving requires something more.  Second, 
we cannot yet know or agree on what we really need—what that something 
more is, exactly.  That being the case, we need at least to retain the capacity 
to keep looking.  Recall that our inability to define what counts as a rich and 
full life was initially framed as an objection to thinking about the impact of 
speech on character or thriving.  Here, that very inability is revealed as itself 
a reason to work to retain a specific trait—the capacity to care about and talk 
about what we cannot nail down.  Finally, it is at least likely that the things 
which will perhaps conduce to our thriving will be things that we can never 
nail down—things like meaning, purpose, love, and an appreciation of the 
world’s beauty.  And yes, I write this knowing that it is likely to induce eye 
rolling or a sort of cultural intellectual gag reflex.  But that too is more 
evidence of the necessity for this virtue than a reason not to engender it.  In 
fact, I might define this redescribed form of piety in just that way—as the 
willingness and ability not to roll our eyes at, and thus avoid thinking and 
talking about, the things we know matter, simply because those things are 
hard to understand. 
It would be helpful to have a better name for this trait because the term 
“piety” carries with it an entire range of unfortunate connotations, many of 
which are almost the opposite of the trait I am trying to describe.  It can 
induce the very eye-rolling resistance the virtue is meant to help us 
overcome.  It can suggest closed-minded sanctimoniousness, while what I 
mean is in fact a kind of openness.  It can suggest small-minded conformity, 
 15.  Piety is defined as “[h]abitual reverence and obedience to God (or the gods); devotion to 
religious duties and observances; godliness, devoutness, religiousness.”  7 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 843 (1970). 
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while what I mean is just the opposite—a willingness to think and speak in 
ways and about things which are less small, less bound by the ways in which 
legal and political conventions encourage us to think and speak.  It can 
suggest fearful meekness, while what I am trying to describe is rather a sort 
of courage.  We roll our eyes when we are afraid to look.  Perhaps 
“aspiration,” a term I have used elsewhere, would be better, but that carries 
its own connotations at odds with the trait I am trying to describe.  
Aspiration can suggest focused goal setting, in the sense of deciding and 
identifying clearly exactly what you want and aiming for it.  There is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with goal setting, but the key feature of the sort 
of aspiration I suggest is the ability to pursue what we cannot yet identify 
clearly.  Perhaps largeness of soul, or something along those lines, would be 
better, but that would carry connotations as well, and would itself need to be 
defined.  In the end, piety is as good a term as any, and perhaps the need to 
overcome the gag reflex it may inspire will remind us of the nature of the 
virtue itself. 
D.  Modeling Character 
With those two related virtues on the table, we can turn to a third way in 
which persuasive speech may construct character—through the modeling of 
traits by the speaker.  One way to help a man be better is to show him how to 
be better—by embodying attributes, through both action and speech, in ways 
which show those attributes to be worthy of emulation. 
This is not quite the same thing, though closely related, as the concept of 
ethos, under which heading classical rhetoric has long recognized that the 
personal credibility and authority of a speaker can be a key element of 
persuasion.  We persuade, in part, by demonstrating to the listener qualities 
which make us seem worth listening to—expertise, trustworthiness, and 
experience.  Trial lawyers recognize that projecting credibility is as crucial 
as making clever arguments.  Those thinking about homiletics have 
recognized that a sermon is not merely argument, but also performance16— 
one aspect of this performance is the character displayed by the preacher.  
But these and most examples of thinking about what is sometimes called 
ethical argumentation focus on the character or perceived character of the 
speaker, which is seen as essentially instrumental to the persuasive or 
pedagogical goal of the argument or message.  My emphasis here is on the 
listener, and on the consequences, rather than the causes, of persuasion. 
Socrates, throughout the Apology, embodies and models traits he hopes 
to engender in his hearers and in his city.17  Most obviously, he shows 
 16.  See, e.g., JANA CHILDERS, PERFORMING THE WORD: PREACHING AS THEATRE 9 (1998). 
 17.  PLATO, supra note 1, at 17a–42a. 
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courage in the face of death.18  In addition, however, he models and seeks to 
construct the traits we have described as temperance and piety.  He 
demonstrates through his speech, as he did through his life, that he is not 
focused on pleasure or pain—not because he is inured, but because he has 
more important things on his mind.19  He also demonstrates that he is willing 
to wrestle with things he cannot yet nail down, even when those things 
become difficult or dangerous to talk about.20  Indeed, his courage is itself 
arguably a manifestation of those deeper traits.  We can do the same.  
Although our own fora will rarely give us the chance to perform so vividly 
such central traits, we too can model ways of being through our speech.  In 
particular, we can model the capacity we have described as piety.  We can 
show, perhaps more effectively than we can advocate, the willingness and 
capacity to aspire to and wrestle with things that matter, but which are 
difficult to define and measure. 
As I suggested above, it is not hubris to try and wrestle with these 
difficult issues.  There is, however, another related, but less well-known, 
ancient Greek term which does apply: 	
 (megalegoria).  
Translated literally, it means something like “big speech,” and some 
translate it as “lofty utterance.”  This is the way Xenophon described 
Socrates’ speech to the Athenian jurors, the same speech more fully 
recounted by Plato in the Apology.21  The term is rare in the surviving Greek 
texts, and where it appears elsewhere often has the negative connotation one 
might imagine—a combination of hubris and 	  (makros 
logos), meaning “long talk” or “rigmarole.”  As Xenophon uses the term, 
however, it points to something positive, even essential.  It is, in fact, 
another external manifestation of the internal trait for which we have 
borrowed the term piety.  That trait—the courage and the capacity to aspire 
to things beyond our ken—shows itself and is constructed through the 
external sorts of religious observances suggested by the traditional meaning 
of the term piety.  But the courage and capacity to care for larger things 
reveals itself also in the courage and willingness to speak in larger ways—
even when one can expect to encounter cynicism or narrowness in response.  
Megalegoria describes speech which is not big because it is puffed up, but 
large because it confronts large things—not inflated, but capacious. 
 18.  Id. at 29a–b. 
 19.  Id. at 35b–c. 
 20.  Id. at 29a–c. 
 21.  XENOPHON, Apology of Socrates to the Jury, in THE SHORTER SOCRATIC WRITINGS: 
“APOLOGY OF SOCRATES TO THE JURY,” “OECONOMICUS,” AND “SYMPOSIUM” 9, 9 (Robert C. 
Bartlett ed., Andrew Patch trans., 1996). 
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More to the point, just as the external manifestation of this trait in the 
form of religious observances does not merely reveal, but can also build, the 
more crucial internal capacity, so too can this other external manifestation, 
in the form of largeness of speech.  Largeness of speech does not just evince, 
but can also construct—in ourselves and our listeners—largeness of soul.  
The willingness and capacity to think about character and virtue is itself one 
of the virtues our speech should help construct, and the willingness to talk 
about such matters is perhaps the most essential way we can do that.  This is 
one of the ways in which our legal speech could be better and more 
courageous than it is. 
Why courageous?  In what way does megalegoria display courage, as 
well as piety?  To enlarge and ennoble our speech requires and displays 
courage because one of the things that keeps our speech small is fear.  We 
can fear being perceived as preachy, smug, or judgmental.  These are 
sensible fears, if only because speakers and arguments perceived in those 
ways are unlikely to be persuasive.  So, we need to think about how we can 
speak to the things that matter without giving rise unnecessarily to those 
predictable perceptions. 
And there is another closely-related kind of speech-diminishing fear we 
ought to acknowledge, and which perhaps we must simply overcome.  That 
is the fear of being laughed at—the enduring adolescent fear of seeming 
uncool.  Academic discourse can sometimes encourage a kind of clever 
cynicism.  We relish deflating people or things that seem puffed up—poking 
holes in pretensions.  Fine; but not everything large is merely inflated, and 
not every aspiration is merely pretention.  I think many so-called realists are 
like small weak boys, afraid of saying something that the other boys might 
sneer at.  We need to grow up and overcome that fear—not allow ourselves 
to be bullied.  As is so often the case with boys, we may find that if we have 
the courage of our convictions, they will laugh less—it is our insecure 
discomfort with larger things which produces disdain.  Were a boy to show 
up at school wearing his father’s too-large suit, the other boys would laugh, 
but at the ill fit, not at the size of the suit itself.  On a big enough boy, a big 
suit would fit.  If we had only small things to talk about—wealth and 
preference satisfaction, for example—it would be laughable for us to try and 
enlarge our speech.  But if we hope to model piety of the sort we have 
described—the capacity to care about large things—we need the courage to 
model it through megalegoria.  We need to be brave enough to risk some 
cynical sneering and speak in ways that are capacious enough to fit. 
Two decades ago, Jerry Frug came closer to addressing the potential 
constitutive effects of persuasion when he noted that a speaker models not 
just attributes, but also a set of priorities and values, and in appealing to 
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those, implicitly invites the listener to share those priorities.22  This calls our 
attention to the less overt ways in which argument may influence character, 
for modeling traits is not the only, or even perhaps the most important, way 
in which we may invite our listeners to develop or embody them.  What we 
need to think about are the indirect and inadvertent ways in which we may 
influence those we persuade. 
E.  Indirect Engendering 
The first and most obvious way we may indirectly enlarge or diminish 
our hearers is simply through the substantive arguments we choose to make.  
Whatever we appeal to, we implicitly assume it matters to those to whom we 
speak.  So, every argument we make is a sort of indirect attribution of traits 
and priorities.  If all we appeal to are things like wealth, health, and safety, 
we reveal an assumption that those are the only things our hearers are 
capable of caring about, and we help make that assumption a reality. 
One reason we so often base our arguments on appeals to such things is 
that it is easy.  Everyone can recognize the value of material goods, so we do 
not have to work to help people see that value.  We can take refuge in least 
common denominators.  Another reason our speech is small is that small is 
safe.  No one will roll their eyes at us or think us presumptuous if we limit 
our arguments to wealth, health, and safety.  If we stay low enough, no one 
can knock us down.  But we want to help people rise above those least and 
common things and care about better things—things which have a better 
chance of helping them thrive.  We need to find the courage and the capacity 
to appeal to those better things. 
For example, in the context of education policy, if we believe that 
learning is valuable—that it is or can be part of a full rich life, rather than 
merely career training or job qualification—we should find ways to describe 
and appeal to that value.  In the context of public spending on sports or art, if 
we believe that the community-building potential of sports teams or the 
enriching potential of public art are worth recognizing and preserving, we 
need to be able to think and talk about those things.  In the context of 
zoning, if we care about, and hope others will care about, the subtle effects 
of architecture and land use on the quality of our lives or the nature of our 
community relationships, we need to consider and try to articulate those 
effects. 
 22.  Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869–70 (1988). 
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Nor do I mean merely that we need to be able to talk about principles 
such as fairness or equality.  That matters, and talking about values such as 
these can be one way to talk about who we are, but we need also to find 
ways of describing and appealing to traits and capacities which are not 
derived ontologically from some set of principles, but which we feel will 
help us thrive.  In the context of anti-discrimination law, for example, we 
need to be able to think and talk, not merely about purported moral, 
constitutional, or other mandates, but also about the ways in which how we 
treat each other helps us grow in our ability to live fully and well. 
None of this is easy.  The impact of law on how we live and thrive is 
hard to talk about in part because it is hard to think about.  How can we 
communicate and appeal to what we have not really figured out?  But all of 
us who think and communicate for a living have learned something about 
that difficulty.  We have learned that the process of attempting to 
communicate a difficult idea is one of the ways—sometimes the best and 
only way—to work it out.  Moreover, recall that one of the virtues we hope 
to engender, for which trait we have borrowed the term piety, is the 
willingness and capacity to aspire to and care about things we cannot nail 
down.  If so, we should display that willingness and capacity.  Rather than 
ducking hard, but important, things, we should find ways of thinking and 
talking about them. 
Recall also that one of the ways in which we may construct character 
through speech is through attribution.  When we attribute a trait or capacity, 
we give a hearer a chance to see himself in that way.  We turn his attention 
to that aspect of his character, in the hope that he will like what he sees and 
will want to grow, and grow into, that part of who he is.  Above, I 
highlighted the possibility of attributing traits directly and explicitly.  But 
perhaps a better way to attribute a quality or capacity is by demonstrating, 
rather than merely expressing, our belief that our hearers have that quality or 
capacity.  The size and scope of our speech can not only model the courage 
and capacity to wrestle with difficult questions of character and thriving, it 
can also reveal our belief that our hearers have or can develop that courage 
and capacity.  By contrast, a fearful avoidance of big things reveals, and thus 
can entrench, the very smallness we hope to overcome.  Talking down to 
people is no way to lift them up. 
Socrates did not talk down to the jurors.  Instead, he used his death as he 
had used his life—in an effort to ennoble those with whom he spoke.  His 
willingness to enlarge the scope of his defense revealed his belief that his 
jurors were or could be large enough to hear him.  Now, one might be 
tempted to say that Socrates’ effort was not a success.  After all, the jury 
convicted him.  But the point here is not that larger speech will guarantee 
victory.  Again, Socrates was concerned not with saving his own life, but 
with helping and encouraging his hearers—among whom we must now 
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number ourselves—to develop the traits and capacities that could help them 
thrive.  He wanted them to value their souls over their safety, for which 
capacity we have borrowed the term “temperance.”  He wanted them, and 
now us, to care for what matters, even when it is hard to define and difficult 
to explain, which capacity we have called “piety.”  And to those ends, he not 
only extolled and modeled, but also attributed to his hearers, directly and 
indirectly, the ability to develop these capacities.  It is hard to know whether 
or to what extent that effort was a success.  It remains to be seen.  Or 
perhaps we should say it remains up to us. 
Given the willingness and desire to wrestle with bigger things in our 
speech, it remains difficult, and comes with risk.  How can we enlarge our 
speech in ways that might enlarge the capacities of our listeners?  It will not 
do to simply puff up our speech with big talk.  And here is where legal 
speakers can learn from religious speakers.  They cannot duck these sorts of 
things, or take refuge in least common denominators.  So they find ways. 
One thing religious speakers do is employ metaphors and similes to get 
at things that matter, but are hard to define.  So essential is metaphor, in 
particular to religious speech, that one could list unlimited examples.  God is 
described as the Father.23  The church is described throughout the New 
Testament as the Bride of Christ.24  Jesus describes himself as the bread of 
life,25 and his disciples as the salt of the Earth.26 
Granted, metaphors bring risk.  In particular, having found or grown 
accustomed to an appealing metaphor, we can be tempted to think we have 
something figured out when we do not.  Metaphors do not spare us the task 
of thinking about difficult things; they help us perform that task.  Where the 
things we care about can be captured adequately more directly, we should do 
so, but where things that matter cannot be measured and defined, we should 
wrestle with them as best we can.  The only other option is to ignore them.  
As one thoughtful theologian put it: “Although metaphor is uncertain and 
risky, it is not expendable; one must live with the open-endedness since 
there is no way to get at the principal subject directly.”27  So, we should not 
 23.  See, e.g., 1 John 3:1 (New King James Version) (“Behold what manner of love the Father 
has bestowed on us, that we should be called children of God!”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Ephesians 5:22–24 (New King James Version) (“Wives, submit to your own 
husbands, as to the Lord.  For the husband is head of the wife, as also Christ is head of the church; 
and He is the Savior of the body.  Therefore, just as the church is subject to Christ, so let the wives 
be to their own husbands in everything.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., John 6:35 (New King James Version). 
 26.  See, e.g., Matthew 5:13 (New King James Version). 
 27.  SALLIE MCFAGUE TESELLE, SPEAKING IN PARABLES: A STUDY IN METAPHOR AND 
THEOLOGY 45 (1975). 
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employ metaphors as argument-enders or trumps.  We should instead 
consider what they imply, see what they can help us see, think about the 
extent to which we are convinced that we have captured something 
worthwhile well, and meet them with competing metaphors. 
Those who write and think about the law do use metaphor, of course, 
especially when forced to try and describe things which cannot be avoided, 
but which defy quantification or precise ontological description.  The best 
example may be the law of free speech, and in particular when courts try to 
articulate the idea and importance of conscience.28 
Free speech and conscience are topics that cannot be avoided, and so 
literally compel the law to broaden its ways of thinking and speaking.  We 
should learn to use similar techniques in addressing other matters that call 
upon us to enlarge our speech—areas where larger speech may not be 
compelled by the subject matter, but would be useful and enlarging.  
A closely related method of trying to capture and communicate ways of 
being is through narrative and story.  As with metaphor, religious speakers 
employ narrative constantly.  Jesus taught in parables.  Preachers illustrate 
sermons with stories.29  It is at least sometimes possible to capture and 
communicate a difficult or potentially complicated idea better through 
narrative than analysis.  And the thing we are trying to find ways to talk 
about here—the impact our ways of being may have on the quality of our 
lives—may often be the very sort of difficult and potentially complicated 
thing better illustrated than explained.  Where legal scholars have 
encouraged or employed narrative techniques, it has often been in the 
service of giving voice to under-represented perspectives and interests.30  
That has value, but I am talking here about under-represented ideas. 
Just as with metaphor, narrative can be well or poorly employed.  There 
is the risk that a story will obscure rather than illuminate.  It can be tempting 
to avoid the work necessary to clarify and communicate a difficult idea by 
 28.  The metaphor used most frequently in free speech cases is that freedom of expression is a 
“marketplace of ideas.”  See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The relationship of 
speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of 
ideas.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
 29.  See Michael Quicke, History of Preaching, in THE ART AND CRAFT OF BIBLICAL 
PREACHING 64, 65 (Haddon Robinson & Craig Brian Larson eds., 2005) (“Narrative preachers have 
a defining belief that sermons should have a story form that catches listeners up in an experience of 
God’s truth.  Though most preachers use stories, this kind of preaching pays particular attention to 
hearers’ listening patterns and plans sermons accordingly.”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in 
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1993) (“[S]cholars seeking 
methods to make the law more responsive to those historically unrepresented in lawmaking have 
argued for a more explicit use of the narrative to highlight the human concerns in a given legal 
issue.”). 
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taking refuge in an appealing narrative.  More to the point, not every 
preacher, and certainly not every lawyer, is a good storyteller.  Many a 
sermon has been diminished, and many a congregation bored and distracted, 
by an overly-long and marginally-relevant story designed to illustrate a point 
that could have been better and more clearly made directly.  I recognize, in 
fact, that I may have been guilty of that very failing by relating the story of 
my father at undue length. 
The misuse of narrative is not only a poor use of the hearer’s time and 
attention, it is also a potentially diminishing use.  Recall that the scope of 
our speech also attributes and potentially constructs capacities in our hearers.  
When a preacher or teacher substitutes a cute or clever story for a clear, if 
difficult, explanation, he or she risks communicating a belief that the hearer 
does not have the capacity to wrestle with it more deeply or directly.  Stories 
should deepen analysis, not substitute for it.  But, as with metaphor, if 
narrative is the best or only way to communicate an idea—as is particularly 
likely to be the case with ideas about the relationships between ways of 
being and thriving—we need to do our best.  If my father’s story is too long 
or poorly told, but yet a story is the best way to illustrate my point, I need to 
shorten it or learn to tell it better or find a better story.  What we should not 
do is abandon stories because they take work.  Much less should we abandon 
a point because it calls for a story.  We should enlarge our speech to 
accommodate the hard things we think matter, not diminish our thinking to 
fit our easy ways of speaking. 
F.  Context and Community 
One way in which people figure out how to be, and become who they 
are, is through communities defined in particular ways.  Communities—
churches, clubs, schools, sports teams, even nations and cities—are not 
merely associations of people who each have particular goals, priorities, 
beliefs, or aspirations, and then come together with others who share those.  
Rather, our communities are also the vehicles through which we articulate 
our aspirations and beliefs—through which we imagine, as well as seek to 
develop, traits and capacities. 
So, one way in which we can attribute and potentially engender traits or 
priorities is by describing or portraying a community as defined in part by 
those traits or priorities.  This is not so much a separate way in which speech 
may construct character, as it is one of the ways in which various forms of 
direct and indirect attribution do their work.  In addition to attributing 
capacities to particular individuals or even particular audiences, we can 
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attribute them to the communities through which our hearers define 
themselves. 
Religious speech does this regularly and naturally.  Rabbis talk about 
the tradition and community that is Judaism.  They talk, argue, and preach 
about what aspects of practice and belief are or are not essential to that 
tradition and community.  Preachers talk about what it means or ought to 
mean to be a Christian, and they too talk and argue, both between and within 
denominations, about what ways of being and believing are central to that 
identity.  Nor is this true only for highly hierarchical religions or 
denominations, or in those in which membership in a particular community 
or communion is considered central to identity or essential to salvation.  
Even those ways of thinking that most emphasize the individual’s direct 
relationship with God, and those most ecumenical in their theology, often 
understand themselves as communities—defined in part by those very ways 
of being.  In each context, these conversations about community are not just 
about belief and practice, but also about character.  Religious communities 
define themselves in part by what they think and what they do, of course, but 
also define themselves by what kind of people those beliefs and practices 
show them to be or help them become.  So, those who speak about religion 
know that one way to help a person develop is by helping to define a 
community through which he can do so. 
Lincoln did this, perhaps most famously in the Gettysburg Address, 
when he described the nation as one “dedicated to the proposition that all 
men are created equal.”31  This was not merely description, it was 
construction.  Few at that time would have placed this introductory phrase 
from The Declaration of Independence at the center of American political 
identity.  But Lincoln did.  He highlighted that thread—that aspect of who 
we are—and offered it as way of understanding ourselves which would 
enable us to make sense of and move forward from the carnage and 
confusion of civil war.  He attributed to the community a desire and capacity 
to live up to that understanding, and in doing so, helped engender that desire 
and capacity.  Now, it would not have done for Lincoln to simply make up a 
trait.  If the set of capacities and priorities evoked by the usefully vague idea 
of a people dedicated to equality were not at least nascent in the community 
and its members, invoking them would have been in vain.  We cannot 
simply attribute traits at will.  But communities are often, if not always, in 
the process of self-definition, especially during difficult times.  So, when we 
speak to and for our communities, we have the opportunity to help them 
understand and construct who they are. 
 31.  President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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So, we should think carefully about what explicit or implicit account of 
our communities we offer.  What do you say about its history, its aims, its 
defining traits?  What do you say about what a particular decision will mean 
to and say about them?  Socrates does this in the Apology, both when he 
describes his city and when he talks about what his conviction will signify.32 
By calling on lawyers to embody in our arguments usefully constitutive 
descriptions of community, it may seem as though I am asking us to do 
something beyond the scope of our ordinary and appropriate work.  Can 
lawyers with cases to win, for example, really be expected to take time to 
define community through particular or valuable character traits?  They can.  
Or rather, they already are.  Defining our communities can be a useful 
persuasive device, and thus a way of doing our regular work.  We are 
already describing community through argument.  The only question is how 
we describe it, and thus what we may help it become.  This is perhaps most 
evident in the context of common-law legal reasoning and argument, which 
is inherently communitarian in this way.  New cases make us try to 
understand old cases, which makes us try to understand our law more 
generally, which makes us think about who we are or want to be. 
One way we often describe common-law reasoning is as a process of 
looking to precedent, extracting rules, and applying those rules to new cases.  
That description is not so much wrong as inadequate.  A better description is 
this: We seek to decide new cases in ways which are consistent with how we 
have decided cases of that sort in the past.  That slightly-altered description 
of the process reminds us that the so-called legal rules we apply in the 
common-law are actually descriptions of cases, not independent things.  
What we want to understand and be consistent with are the cases and their 
reasoning.  And recognizing that, in turn, calls our attention to the fact that 
the cases are themselves efforts to achieve a larger sort of consistency—
efforts to decide particular issues in ways which are consistent with our law 
more generally.  And that calls our attention more deeply to the ways in 
which our law is reflective and constitutive of who we are. 
Now, granted, few cases call upon lawyers to go this deep, and most 
legal arguments are not the Gettysburg Address.  Many legal issues can be 
dealt with well enough without thinking about or addressing the underlying 
aspects of community identity or character revealed or constructed by the 
issue at hand.  But some cannot.  And some should not.  Where the issue at 
hand does bear a connection to who we are as a community, we ought to be 
willing to think about and speak to the matter.  Moreover, we should 
 32.  PLATO, supra note 1, at 38c–42a. 
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recognize that we are often describing our community even when we do not 
mean or purport to do so. 
At some level, in fact, every argument about what we should do is also 
an implicit argument about who we are.  Habits of mind are engendered and 
entrenched in part through habits of action.  So, if our communities are 
vehicles through which we act, they are also vehicles through which we 
decide and become who we are.  Our political communities, therefore, like 
our churches and schools and sports teams, are not just places through which 
we imagine and articulate traits and capacities, they are vehicles through 
which we exhibit and develop them.  This is why, in earlier works, I have 
tried to examine some of the ways in which substantive law and politics may 
impact character and thriving—how public action may influence public 
character.33  Here, focusing on argument—on the way we talk about the 
law—the question is whether we are thoughtful about and take responsibility 
for the ways in which we are describing and constructing the communities 
for and to which we speak. 
So, setting aside substantive law, each time we argue that something 
should be done, we invite the community to which we speak to see itself as 
the sort of community that would or ought to do that thing.  This is the 
attribution of traits by the arguments we make, just as described above, but 
applied indirectly to individuals through their communities.  Even an 
argument that does not explicitly describe community does so implicitly in 
at least this way, and we should take responsibility for those descriptions. 
And we can do more.  We can often include explicit and potentially 
constitutive descriptions of our legal and political communities in our 
arguments, and to the benefit of, rather than as an aside to, the substantive 
points we aim to make.  A lawyer arguing a free speech case might highlight 
the arguably defining traits of openness and honesty and being thick-
skinned, which are embodied and encouraged through a robust doctrine of 
free speech.  A criminal defense lawyer might speak to a jury explicitly of 
how the reasonable doubt standard, or the institution of the jury itself, reflect 
the community’s longstanding commitments to courageous and judicious 
responsibility-taking.34  An education advocate might argue: “We have 
always been a community that recognizes that learning is valuable in itself, 
for personal growth, as well as for career training.”  Now, if there were no 
truth to the description, the argument would fail both as persuasion and 
character construction.  But if a description resonates, it may also help 
define.  If a description of community was to some extent true before it was 
 33.  See Clark, Neoclassical Public Virtues, supra note 14; Clark, Ennobling Direct Democracy, 
supra note 14, at 1346–50. 
 34.  See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2384–89 
(1999). 
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articulated and offered as a potential reason for action, it may well be more 
true afterwards. 
In addition to describing our communities, we can also model traits 
through and on behalf of them, because we are often members of the 
communities to and in which we speak.  In many cases, in fact, we are likely 
to be perceived as representative members of those communities.  A pastor 
or rabbi is not merely a member of a congregation, but someone who will be 
looked to as speaking for, even embodying, that community.  Something 
similar can be said for a political leader or a teacher in a classroom.  If so, 
when we display and model traits, we are not simply saying: “Look at me.  
This is how I am.  Be with me.”  We are also saying: “Look at us.  This is 
how we are.  Be with us.” 
By modeling ways of being, therefore, we do not merely invite 
emulation, we also define community and invite inclusion.  For example, 
when a law teacher conducts a first-year class in a particular way, perhaps 
by showing an appreciation for opposing views or revealing honestly the 
limits of her own knowledge, she does not simply model that way of 
thinking on her own behalf, such that the appeal and potential constitutive 
impact of that example depends entirely on the extent to which students 
admire or want to emulate her.  She also demonstrates for the students a set 
of traits that they are invited to see as emblematic of the scholarly 
community and profession they are being invited to join.  Similarly, when a 
preacher shows thoughtfulness and patience, for example, she sets forth 
those traits as potentially characteristic of the community to which and for 
which she speaks.  And here, too, we can model either ennobling or 
diminishing aspects of character.  Think of the teacher who bullies, or the 
preacher who threatens, rather than consoles. 
How this might work in a particular case depends largely, perhaps 
entirely, on context.  What are the potentially ennobling traits that define the 
community for which you speak?  How can you, in that context, exemplify 
them in your speech?  These questions cannot be addressed at a general 
level.  But that very difficulty is itself perhaps fortuitous.  Thinking about 
how we might model for and construct in our communities valuable traits 
can usefully encourage and help us to think about the traits themselves.  We 
reflect our communities, but in the process must see ourselves more clearly 
as well. 
There are, I am sure, many more, and more subtle, ways in which our 
speech may exhort or attribute or otherwise construct character and thus 
impact our capacity to thrive, and other perhaps more effective ways we may 
attend to and take responsibility for that reality.  I am limited here, frankly, 
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not just by the space constraints of an essay, but also by my own lack of 
knowledge and ability.  Like most of us trained in the law, I have not been 
trained in talking about the ways in which law impacts character and 
thriving, much less in the ways in which our speech about the law may 
factor into that equation.  My effort here, therefore, is not to catalogue those 
ways, but to call for attention to them.  My hope is that the next generation 
of lawyers will be better in this regard than we are—more capable of 
thinking and talking about the ways in which our law makes up who we are.  
If they aim to be so, and if we aim to help them, one place we should look—
one example from which we can draw—will be speech about religion.  What 
lawyers have ignored or avoided, religious speakers have been forced to 
confront, and seeing the kinship between our different, but over-lapping, 
work can perhaps help us learn to confront those things as well. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THINKING AND PERSUADING 
As a lawyer and law teacher, my focus has been on what those of us 
who argue and teach about the law can learn from those who think and talk 
about religion, but I also believe that those who speak about religion may be 
able to learn something from us.  Lawyers do not always think or speak as 
deeply or as bravely as do preachers, but there is a sense in which the 
discipline of the law can enhance and broaden our thinking in ways which 
may be valuable to those who speak about religion.  Lawyers have our own 
rhetorical challenges—our own potentially educative necessities.  In 
particular, the demands of regular and particularized persuasion force upon 
us, and can develop in us, the capacity to see difficult issues from the 
perspectives of others.  If this necessity were to conduce merely to relativism 
or sophistry, as is sometimes assumed or alleged, preachers would perhaps 
have little to learn from lawyers.  But, in fact, the habit of mind of full and 
thoughtful engagement with opposing views, even if initially developed for 
instrumental ends, can be an enriching intellectual capacity.  Seeing difficult 
issues from varying angles, which is a capacity lawyers must develop in 
order to argue persuasively, can help us see and understand those difficult 
issues better and more clearly ourselves, just as an art lover walks around a 
sculpture to get a better look, or an explorer triangulates to figure out where 
he is.  And both of these capacities—persuasiveness and understanding—
ought to be as much valued and sought by those who speak about religion as 
by those of us who argue about the law. 
At the very least, those of us who teach and persuade about the law can 
recognize that the habits of mind we have developed as lawyers can help 
rather than hinder us in our efforts to enlarge our speech—to make it more 
ennobling.  We can think carefully about the ways in which those to whom 
we speak see or want to see themselves and the world, and we can think 
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charitably about what they care about or are capable of caring about.  If we 
do, we may find that they do not see or want to see themselves as concerned 
merely with gain or glory—with costs and benefits and preference 
satisfaction.  We may find that they are willing and eager to aspire to better 
things—to traits and capacities harder to articulate, but better able to help 
them thrive—and that they are fully capable of doing so.  And if we can see 
in them that willingness and ability, perhaps we can find in ourselves the 
courage and capacity to help them articulate those things. 
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